Part II. Tolerance: different notions of tolerance for different approaches to vagueness. A metaphysicalist notion of tolerance would be one that isn't cast in semantic or epistemic terms. Is such a notion available? Well, I think one is available. It would have to be one which still blocks the sorites. Prof. McGee thinks the notion--e.g. topological openness--is a nonstarter for vague objecthood. Not so clear it is a nonstarter for vagueness in general.
The relevant sorites here was a phenomenal sorites, so Delia Graff's position was discussed. Not clear what hangs on the fact that it was phenomenal, though. Perhaps that there doesn't seem to be an nonphenomenologically specifiable `parameter of application' for colored bits. We are inclined to accept statements like `if we can't tell them apart, then they are the same shade.' We are not inclined to accept such a statement for tallness: one person can certainly be taller than another, by just a bit, even if we can't inspect this difference.
Graff's contextualist take on the sorites must be importantly connected to the claim that every (color?-)point is located in some neighborhood of the same color. It is the size of that neighborhood which is non-constant (= context-dependent?)
Stage III. Back to Mereology. Very unclear what to say here. All the options are on the table, and none seem exciting. Postulating vague objects as a solution to problems of material constitution and mereological indeterminacy (that is, no answer to the `which'? question) seems to be foolhardy, like postulating `false objects' as the truthmakers of claims of the form `p is false,' or postulating a Mr. Nobody as the referent of ``nobody." Not sure there is a bun in the oven here.
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